Abstract Secure set-intersection computation is one of important problems in secure multiparty computation with various applications. We propose a general construction for secure 2-party set-intersection computation based-on anonymous IBE (identity-based encryption) scheme and its user private-keys blind generation techniques. Compared with related works, this construction is provably GUC(generalized universally composable) secure in standard model with acceptable efficiency. In addition, an efficient instantiation based-on the anonymous Boyen-Waters IBE scheme is presented which user private-key's blind generation protocol may be of independent values.
INTRODUCTION
Secure set-intersection computation is one of important problems in the field of secure multiparty computation with valuable applications in, e.g., secure keyword searching, pattern matching, private database processing, etc. In secure set-intersection computation, participants with their own private datasets get the intersection of all their private sets and nothing more(except for each private set's cardinality). In this paper, like most recent works, we focus on the 2-party case and make an efficient GUC-secure, standard model protocol for it.
Much work has been done in designing solutions to secure computation for different cryptographic functions, but only few are about this special problem among which [8, [11] [12] are most relevant to this paper. They are heuristic and valuable works on secure set-intersection computation published most recently, each using different techniques and security concepts and most of them(except [12] ) mainly dealing with the 2-party case. However, none reaches Canetti's UC/GUC security [4] [5] [6] . In [8] Freedman et al present provably-secure and efficient protocols for this problem against semi-honest and malicious adversaries respectively based-on polynomial interpolation and homomorphic encryption schemes. The solution against malicious adversaries assumes the random oracle model. [12] solves this problem (and more, e.g., union and element reduction operations) via smartly exploiting mathematical properties of polynomials and has fully-simulatable security [10] so that their solution is securely composable(but the concept of fully-simulatable security is strictly weaker than Canetti's UC/GUC security proposed in [4] [5] ). In addition, as indicated by [11] , [12] executes lots of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge most of which are known how to efficiently realize but not all. Most recently [11] proposes solutions to this problem via oblivious pseudorandom function evaluation techniques. They work in two relaxed adversary models to achieve security of "half-simulatability" and "full-simulatability preserving its proved security. A similar consequence is also ture in UC theory but with some serious constraints. All details are presented in [4] [5] (ACRS model is defined in [5] 's sec. 4 , or see Appendix A in our paper).
IBE Scheme, Its Anonymity and Blind User-Private Key Generation Protocol
In addition to data-privacy, anonymity(key-privacy) is another valuable property for public-key encryption schemes [2] . An IBE scheme П=(Setup, UKG, E, D) is a group of P.P.T. algorithms, where Setup takes as input the complexity parameter k to generate master public/secret-key pair (mpk, msk), UKG takes as input msk and user's id a to generate a's user private-key usk(a); E takes (mpk,a,M) as input where M is the message plaintext to generate ciphertext y, D takes (mpk,usk(a),y) as input to do decryption. Altogether these algorithms satisfy the consistency property: for any k, a and M
P[(mpk,msk)←Setup(k); usk(a)←UKG(msk,a); y←E(mpk, a, M): D(mpk,usk(a), y)=M]=1
Definition 2.2(IBE Scheme's chosen plaintext anonymity [2] ) Given an IBE scheme Π=(Setup, UKG,E,D), for any P.P.T. attacker A=(A 1 ,A 2 ) consider the following experiment (k Now we present the ideal functionality F П Blind-UKG for an IBE scheme П's user private-key blind generation(note: even IBE scheme is not anonymous such functionality still makes sense. However, in this paper only anonymous IBE's such protocol is needed). In the ideal model, one party generates(just one time) П's master public/secret-key pair (mpk,msk) and submits it to F П Blind-UKG ; F П Blind-UKG generates usk(a)=UKG(msk,a) for another party who submits its private input a(this computation can take place any times and each time for a new a), revealing nothing about a to the party who provides (mpk,msk) except how many private-keys are generated. Formally, let S be the ideal adversary, P 1 *, P 2 * the ideal party, sid and ssid the session-id and subsession-id respectively, the ideal model works as follows: P 1 * selects randomness ρ and computes (mpk,msk)←Setup(ρ), sends the message (sid, mpk||msk||ρ) to F increased by 1 everytime the computation takes place.
At last, P 1 * outputs its last n, P 2 * outputs all its obtained usk(a)'s.
(Identity-Augmented) Non-Malleable Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
This subsection presents the concept of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge following [9, 13] with slight symbolic modifications. Let L be a NP language, R is its associated P-class binary relation. i.e., x∈L iff there exists w such that R(x,w)=1. Let A, B be two machines, then A(x;B) [σ] represents A's output due to its interactions with B under a public common input x and common reference string (c.r.s.) σ, tr A,B (x) [σ] represents the transcripts due to interactions between A and B under a common input x and c.r.s. σ. When we emphasize A's private input, say y, we also use the expression A y (x;B) [σ] and tr A(y),B (x) [σ] 1 and tr 2 are the same message sequence(consisted of the same messages in the same order) and the only difference is that any corresponding messages are in the opposite directions.
Let A be a machine, the symbol A represents such a machine which accepts two kinds of instructions: the first one is in the form of ("start", i,x,w) and A in response starts a new instance of A, associates it with a unique name i and provides it with public input x and private input w; the second is in form of ("message",i,m) and A in response sends message m to instance A i and then returns A i 's response to m. Definition 2.3(Zero-Knowldeg Proof and Non-Malleable Zero-Knowledge Proof Protocol [9, 13] ) ZPoK R =(D crs ,P,V,Sim) where Sim=(Sim 1 ,Sim 2 ) is a group of P.P.T. algorithms, k is complexity parameter, D crs takes k as input and generates c.r.s. σ; P is called prover, takes (σ,x,w) as input where R(x,w)=1 and generates a proof π; V is called verifier, takes (σ,x) as input and generates 0 or 1; Sim 1 (k) generates (σ,s), Sim 2 takes x∈ L and (σ,s) as input and generates the simulation. All algorithms except D crs and Sim 1 take the c.r.s. σ as one of their inputs, so σ is no longer explicitly included in all the following expressions unless for emphasis. Now ZPoK R is defined as a zero-knowledge proof protocol for relation R, if the following properties are all satisfied: (1) For any x∈L and σ←D crs , it's always true that P[V(x;P) [σ] =1]=1; (2) For any P.P.T. algorithm A, x∉L and σ←D crs , it's always true that P[V(x;A) [σ] =1]=0 1 ;
(3) For any P.P.T. algorithm A which outputs 0 or 1, let ε be empty string, the function |P[σ←D crs ; b←A(ε;P) [σ] : b=1] -P[(σ,s)←Sim 1 (k); b←A(ε;Sim 2 (s)) [σ] : b=1]| is always negligible in k, where we emphasize the fact by symbol Sim 2 (s) that all Sim 2 instances have the same s as one of their inputs.
The non-malleable zero-knowledge proof protocol for relation R is defined as NMZPoK R = (D crs ,P,V,Sim,Ext) where Sim=(Sim 1 ,Sim 2 ), Ext=(Ext 1 ,Ext 2 ) and (D crs ,P,V,Sim) is a zero-knowledge proof protocol for relation R as above, P.P.T. algorithm Ext 1 (k) generates (σ,s,τ) and the interactive P.P.T. machine Ext 2 (named as witness extractor) takes (σ,τ) and protocol's transcripts as its input and extracts w, and all the following properties hold: (4) The distribution of the first output of Sim 1 is identical to that of Ext 1 ; (5) For any τ, the distribution of the output of V is identical to that of Ext 2 's restricted output which does not include the extracted value (w); (6) There exists a negligible function η(k) (named as knowledge-error function) such that for any P.P.T. algorithm A=(A 1 ,A 2 ) it's true that It's easy to see that NMZPoK R is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. [9, 13] developed an efficient method to derive non-malleable zero-knowledge proof protocols based-on simulation-sound tag-based commitment schemes and the so-called Ω-protocols(proposed in [13] ). In order to achieve GUC-security in our construction, we need to further enhance NMZPoK to the concept of identity-augmented non-malleable zero-knowldege proof protocol(IA-NMZPoK) as follows. Note that by this definition an IA-NMZPoK protocol works in ACRS model [5] which ACRS is its mpk. In addition, only the corrupt verifier can run Sim(Sim 1 taking usk(V) as input) and only the corrupt prover can run Ext (Ext 1 taking usk(P) as input). This is exactly what is required in the ACRS model. Given a relation R, a general and efficient construction of IA-NMZPoK protocol for R is presented in Appendix D.
Commitment Scheme
We need the non-interactive identity-based trapdoor commitment sheme [5] (IBTC for short) as another important tool in our construction. cmt is M's commitment with respect to id. These algorithms are consistant, i.e., for any M: 
negligible function in k. [5] presented an efficient IBTC construction and proved its security.
GENERAL CONSTRUCTION
Now we present the formal consctrution of the real-world private set-intersection computation protocol Ψ. P 1 and P 2 denote two real-world parties with private set X 1 ={x 1 ,…,x N1 } and X 2 ={y 1 ,…,y N2 } respectively. П=(ESetup,UKG,E,D) is a selective ANO_CPA anonymous IBE scheme, ∆ П Blind-UKG is the real-world protocol for П's user private-keys blind generation. IA-NMZPoK(w:R(x,w)=1) denotes an IA-NMZPoK protocol for relation R where w is x's witness. TC=(D,TSetup,UKG,Cmt,Vf,FakeCmt, FakeDmt) is an IBTC scheme. M 0 is a (fixed) public common plaintext. Ψ's ACRS is mpk TC ||mpk ∆ || mpk ZK ||M 0 where mpk TC , mpk ∆ , mpk ZK are respectively TC's, ∆ П Blind-UKG 's and an IA-NMZPoK protocol(see below)'s master public key. Ψ works as follows:
where r i is the independent randomness in each encryption, then computes (cmt,dmt)←Cmt(mpk TC, P 2 , ξ 1 ||…||ξ N1 ) and sends mpk||cmt to P 2 . (2) P 1 and P 2 run the protocol ∆ П Blind-UKG where P 1 (as the key-generater) inputs (mpk,msk) and P 2 (as the key-receiver) inputs y 1 ,…,y N2 to ∆ This general construction of Ψ is a ∆ П Blind-UKG -hybrid protocol and we require
, ξ i )=M 0 if and only if x i =y j so X 0 =X 1 ∩X 2 , i.e., P 2 outputs the correct intersection. Regarding security, because the IBE scheme П is (selective) anonymous, i.e., ciphertext ξ i hides x i unless P 2 has the correct user private-key usk(x i ), P 2 knows nothing about X 1 beyond X 1 ∩X 2 . On the other hand, ∆ П Blind-UKG 's (GUC) security prevents P 1 from knowing anything about P 2 's private set X 2 .
However, merely requiring ∆
Blind-UKG cannot guarantee Ψ's GUC-security but only "half GUC-security" instead(i.e., the real adversary A corrupting P 1 can be completely simulated by an ideal adversary S but this is not true when A corrupts P 2 . Only data-privacy can be proved in the latter case). In order to make the real adversary always completely simulatable in ideal-world, some additional property is required for ∆ (2) UKG ∆ (msk ∆ ,id) outputs a trapdoor usk ∆ (P 2 ) when id=P 2 (key-receiver's identity) and outputs nothing otherwise. (3) for any user-id a, honest P 1 and any P.P.T. algorithm A, it is true that(via notations in subsection 2.3) Ext 1 (usk(P 2 )) outputs (σ,τ) such that P[Ext 2 (mpk||τ ; A(a)) [σ] =a]>P[A a (mpk; P 1 (mpk,msk)) [σ] =UKG(msk,a)]-δ(k) where (mpk,msk) is П's master public/secret-key owned by P 1 (mpk is published).
We stress that all extractors in definition 2.3 and definition 3.1 are non-rewinding. Combining all the instantiations of subprotocols in this general construction(some presented in next section and Appendix D), it's easy to see that we can get a O(1) and O(N 1 +N 2 ) message-complexity solution. Furthermore P 1 , P 2 has computation-complexity of O(N 1 +N 2 ) and O(N 1 N 2 ) encryptions/decryptions repectively. The exact efficiency analysis can only be done for specific instantiation (e.g., that presented in next section) which is provided in the full version paper. The formal security consequence is the following theorem which proof is in Appendix B.
AN INSTANTIATION VIA BOYEN-WATERS IBE SCHEME
Theorem 3.1 presents security conditions for the general construction Ψ, among which some are available in existing works, e.g., the commitment scheme can be directly borrowed from [5] . The subprotocols which require new efficient constructions are only IBE scheme's user private-keys generation protocol and the protocol IA-NMZPoK((a,r): ξ=E(mpk,a,M 0 ;r)). In this section we present an efficient instantiation of Ψ via Boyen-Waters IBE scheme. All related zero-knowledge protocols' constructions are presented in Appendix D. [3] Given an bilinear group pairing ensemble J={(p,G 
Boyen-Waters IBE
r 1 , r 2 ← $ Z p ; usk(a)←(, , ); ,
User Private-Keys Blind Generation Protocol and Its GUC-Security
For simplicity we only present how to blindly generate usk(a) for a single user-id a. The generalization to blindly generating usk(a 1 )||…||usk(a N ) for multiple user-id's a 1 ||…||a N is trival and still constant-round, though the total message-complexity is linearly increased.
The two parties are P 1 (with private input msk) and P 2 (with private input a). Both parties have the common input mpk where (mpk,msk) are generated by IBE scheme's ESetup(k) (usually msk per se is the randomness in ESetup so we use a simplified notation mpk←ESetup(msk) hereafter).
has two IA-NMZPoK subprotocols (see below) which ACRS's are denoted as mpk ZK 
as a prover with P 1 as a verifier. Denote this protocol as IA-NMZPoK III . 
APPENDIX.A ACRS MODEL
Recently [5] improves and generalizes the early UC-theory proposed in [4] to make a more general, realistic and strictly stronger security notion. The universal composition theorem is still true in this paradigm, however, the pre-setup needs to be strictly enhanced. In GUC paradigm the CRS model is Running Phase: on receiving message ("CRS request",P i ) from any party P i , response ("ACRS", mpk) to P i and the adversary S;
On receiving message ("Retrieve",sid,P i ) from a corrupt party P i , compute usk(P i )←UKG(msk,P i ) and return the message ("Private-key", sid, usk(P i )) to P i ; if P i is not a corrupt party, response nothing.
APPENDIX.B PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
For intuition the protocol Ψ is presented in a figure below. The IA-NMZPoK protocol's arrow points from the zero-knowledge proof's prover to itsverifier.
for each x i ∈X 1 do Now we present the proof sketch. At first it's easy to verify that Ψ produces the correct intersection X 1 ∩X 2 at P 2 . Now we prove its GUC-security in two cases that the real-world adversary A corrupts P 1 or P 2 respectively. Below P 1 * and P 2 * stand for P 1 and P 2 's respective counterparts in ideal-world.
All parties are assumed to be initialized with a copy of the common reference string ACRS, i.e., the concatenation of TC's master public-key mpk TC , ∆ П Blind-UKG 's mpk ∆ , the IA-NMZPoK protocol's mpk ZK and M 0 , generated by the pre-setup G ACRS . For this ACRS, its msk=msk TC ||msk ∆ ||msk ZK and UKG(msk,id) responses with usk(id)=usk TC (id)||usk ∆ (id)||usk ZK (id) where usk TC (id), usk ∆ (id) and usk ZK (id) are respectively TC's, ∆ П Blind-UKG 's and the IA-NMZPoK protocol's user private-keys corresponding to id∈{P 1 ,P 2 }.
(1) A corrupts P 1 : for simplicity we first make the proof in F П Blind-UKG -hybrid model and then complete the proof by generalized universal composition theorem. Let X 1 ={x 1 *,…,x N1 * } be A's(i.e., P 1 's) own set, X 2 ={y 1 *,…,y N2 * } be P 2 *'s own set. We need to construct an ideal adversary S 1 who corrupts P 1 *, runs A as a black-box and simulates the real-world honest party P 2 to interact with A:
On receiving the message (sid,"input",N 2 ) from F INT , S 1 gets usk(P 1 ) by querying the shared functionality G ACRS with ("retrieve",sid,P 1 ) where usk(P 1 )=usk TC (P 1 )||usk ∆ (P 1 )||usk ZK (P 1 )), computes (σ,s,τ)←IA-NMZPoK:: Ext 1 (usk ZK (P 1 ))( to avoid ambiguity, we use Γ::f to represent a protocol Γ's algorithm f), generates N 2 data-items y 1 ,…, y N2 at random and then starts A;
After A sends the first message (mpk||cmt), S 1 interacts with A as an honest key-receiver in model of F Let tr(A,S 1 ) denote the transcripts due to the interaction between S 1 and A, tr ψ (A, P 2 (X 2 )) denote the transcripts due to the interaction between A and P 2 (X 2 ) in the real-world protocol Ψ( P 2 (X 2 ) means the real-world party possessing the same private set X 2 as P 2 *). From A's perspective, the difference between tr(A,S 1 ) and tr ψ (A, P 2 (X 2 )) is that the former provides F П Blind-UKG with {y 1 ,…,y N2 } as the input, the latter provides F the difference between the probability with which P 2 *(X 2 ) outputs X 1 ∩X 2 under the ideal-world adversary S 1 's attacks and the probability with which P 2 (X 2 ) outputs X 1 ∩X 2 under the real-world adversay A's attacks against Ψ is upper-bounded by N 1 (η+ ), also a negligible function in k.
Combining all the above facts, for any P.P. (2) A corrupts P 2 : Denote A's(i.e.,P 2 's) own set as X 2 ={y* 1 ,…,y* N2 }, P 1 *'s own set as X 1 = {x* 1 ,…,x* N1 }, we need to construct an ideal adversary S 2. S 2 corrupts P 2 *, gets usk(P 2 ) by querying the pre-setup G ACRS with ("retrieve",sid,P 2 ) where usk(P 2 )=usk TC (P 2 )||usk ∆ (P 2 )||usk ZK (P 2 ), generates (σ,s)←IA-NMZPoK::Sim 1 (usk ZK (P 2 )), runs A as a black-box and simulates the real-world honest party P 1 to interact with A:
On receiving message (sid,"input",N 1 ) from F INT , S 2 generates x 1 ,…,x N1 at random, computes (mpk,msk)←Setup(k) and ξ i ←E(mpk, x i , M 0 ; r i ) for each x i where r i is the independent randomness in each encryption, computes (cmt 0 ,λ)←FakeCmt(mpk TC ,P 2 ,usk TC (P 2 )), starts A and sends the message mpk||cmt 0 to A; S 2 interacts with A as the user private-key generator in ∆ П Blind-UKG and calls the extractor ∆ П Blind-UKG ::Ext ∆ (usk ∆ (P 2 )) to extract y* 1 ,…,y* N2 , sends the message (sid,"input", P 2 *, {y* 1 ,…,y* N2 }) to F INT ; S 2 sends the message (sid,"intersection",P 2 *) to F INT and gets the response {y* j1 ,…,y* jt }(i.e., the set-intersection). To simplify the symbol, denote this response set as {y* 1 ,…,y* t }. Finally S 2 outputs whatever A outputs to the environment. Let tr(S 2 ,A) denote the transcripts due to the interaction between A and S 2 , tr Ψ (P 1 (X 1 ),A) denote the transcripts due to the interaction between A and the real-world party P 1 (X 1 )(possessing the same set X 1 ={x 1 *,…,x* N1 } as the ideal-world party P 1 *). From A's perspective, the differences between these two transcripts are: a)cmt in these two transcripts are respectively cmt 0 output by FakeCmt and cmt output by Cmt(mpk TC ,P 2 ,E(mpk,x 1 *,M 0 ;r 1 )||…||E(mpk,x* N1 ,M 0 ;r N1 )); b) dmt in these two transcripts are dmt 0 output by FakeDmt and dmt output by Cmt(mpk TC ,P 2 ,E(mpk,x 1 *,M 0 ;r 1 ) ||…||E(mpk,x* N1 ,M 0 ;r N1 )) respectively c)Among the ciphertext sequence ξ 1 ||…||ξ N1 in these two transcripts, there are t ciphertexts ξ i having the same identity public-key(i.e., x* i ) but the remaining N 1 -t ciphertexts having different identity public-keys; d)there are t IA-NMZPoK-witness' with the same x 0 i . By TC's equivocation property, (cmt,dmt)'s are P.P.T.-indistinguishable in both cases; because of IBE scheme's selective ANO_CPA anonymity, ξ 1 ||…||ξ N1 ||dmt in both cases are P.P.T.-indistinguishable (otherwise suppose they are P.P.T.-distinguishable with the difference δ≥1/poly(k), it's easy to construct a selective ANO_CPA attacker against Π with an advantage at least δ/N 1 , contradicting with Π's selective ANO_CPA anonymity). Now denote the ciphertext sequence ξ 1 ||…||ξ N1 in two cases as ξ 1 (1) ||…|| ξ N1
(1) and ξ 1 (2) ||…||ξ N1 (2) respectively, denote the transcripts in session of IA-NMZPoK as IA-NMZPoK (1) (=tr S2(x1,…,xN1),A (mpk||M 0 ||ξ 1 (1) ||…||ξ N1 (1) )) and IA-NMZPoK (2) (=tr P1(x*1,…,x*N1),A (mpk||M 0 ||ξ 1 (2) ||…||ξ N1 (2) ))) respectively, by the above analysis we have ξ 1 (1) , s) so IA-NMZPoK (1) ≈ PPT IA-NMZPoK (2) . As a result, the transcripts received by A in both cases are P.P.T.-indistinguishable. Let δ be ∆ П Blind-UKG 's extractor's error function(negligible in k), then the probability with which S 2 correctly extracts A's one data-item y* i is at least P[A(mpk;P 1 (mpk,msk))=UKG(msk,y* i )]-δ, so the probability with which S 2 correctly extracts A's all data-items y* 1 ,…,y* N2 is at least P[A(mpk;P 1 (mpk, 
APPENDIX.C PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
For intuition the protocol is presented in the figure below, in which IA-NMZPoK's arrows point from zero-knowledge's prover to its verifier. ((a, r 1 , r 2 , y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 
Waters
By direct calculation it's easy to show the protocol's output's correctness. Now we present the GUC-security proof sketch. All parties are assumed to be initialized with a copy of the common reference string ACRS, i.e., the concatenation of the two IA-NMZPoK protocol's mpk ZK,II and mpk ZK,III . For this ACRS, msk=msk ZK,II ||msk ZK,III and UKG(msk,id) outputs usk(id)=usk ZK,II (id)||usk ZK,III (id) where usk ZK,II (id) and usk ZK,III (id) are respectively two IA-NMZPoK protocol's user private-keys corresponding to id∈{P 1 ,P 2 }.
At first it's easy to show there exists an identity extractor for to satisfy definition 3.1.
In fact it is IA-NMZPoK III ((a, r 1 , r 2 , y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 ): Now we prove 's GUC-security in two cases that the real-world adversary A corrupts P 1 or P 2 respectively. Below P 1 * and P 2 * stand for P 1 and P 2 's respective counterparts in ideal-world.
(1) A corrupts P 1 : Suppose A's(i.e., P 1 's) private input is (mpk,msk), P 2 *'s private input is a*. we need to construct an ideal adversary S 1 . S 1 corrupts the ideal-world party P 1 *, gets usk(P 1 ) by querying G ACRS with the message ("retrieve",sid,P 1 ) where usk(P 1 )=usk ZK,II (P 1 )||usk ZK,III (P 1 ), computes (σ II ,s II, ,τ)←IA-NMZPoK II ::Ext 1 (usk ZK,II (P 1 ))(notice that P 1 is the prover in protocol IA-NMZPoK II ), runs A as a black-box. S 1 simulates the real-world honest party P 2 to interact with A: as W. From A's perspective, the transcripts due to its interactions with S 1 and the transcripts due to its interactions with the real-world party P 2 (a*)(P 2 (a*) stands for party P 2 possessing a*, the same private input as the ideal-world party P 2 *) differs in: a)W depends on a in the former case, denoted as W(a),
while it depends on a* in the latter case and denoted as W(a*); b)IA-NMZPoK III 's witness depends on a in the former case while it depends on a* in the latter. The messages of subprotocol IA-NMZPoK III in these two cases are respectively denoted as IA-NMZPoK III (a) and IA-NMZPoK III (a*). We need to construct an ideal-world adversary S 2 which corrupts P 2 *, gets usk(P 2 ) by querying G ACRS with the message ("retrieve",sid,P 2 ) where usk(P 2 )=usk ZK,II (P 2 )||usk ZK,III (P 2 ), runs A as a black-box and simulates the honest real-world party P 1 to interact with A: Now we prove that from A's perspective the transcripts due to its interactions with S 2 and that due to its interactions with P 1 (mpk*,msk*)(a real-world party possessing the same input as the ideal-world party P 1 *) are P.P.T.-indistinguishable.
At first, consider the transcripts in IA-NMZPoK II 's session. Let IA-NMZPoK II (*) and IA-NMZPoK II () denote the messages generated by P 1 (mpk*, msk*) and S 2 in this session respectively. Combining all consequences in the above, the theorem is finally proved. [6, 13] A Ω-protocol for a given relation R is a 3-move protocol in CRS model consisted of P.P.T. algorithms D, A, Z, Φ, Sim and Ext=(Ext 1 ,Ext 2 ). D is the CRS generating algorithm. All algorithms except D takes a CRS ω as one of its inputs. For some (x,w) s.t.R(x,w)=1 the common input for both the prover P and the verifier V is x and witness w is P's private input. In the first move P generates a randomness r, computes a←A(ω,x,w,r) and sends a to V; in the second move, V selects a challenge c at random and sends it back to P; then P computes z←Z(ω,x,w,r,c) and sends z to V in the last move; on receiving z, V outputs "accept" or "refuse" depending on whether Φ(ω,x,a,c,z)=1 or 0. In addition, a Ω-protocol has the following properties [13] :
APPENDIX.D IA-NMZPoK PROTOCOL'S CONSTRUCTION AND INSTANTIATION

D.1 (Dense) Ω-Protocol
(1) For the honest P which behaves under the above specification, Φ(ω,x,a,c,z)=1 is always true.
(2) Given c and x∈L R the simulator Sim(ω,x,c) can generate accepting transcripts with a distribution that is P.P.T.-indistinguishable from those when P and V execute the protocol on common input x while V selects c as the challenge. where B ij and h i are in G and x i 's are integer witness. [6] (see its Appendix.I) presents an efficient construction for relation (D-4)'s dense Ω-protocol which can be directly applied in our work.
